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Abstract 
D&es, J. and A.D. Keedwell, A new authentication scheme based on latin squares, Discrete 
Mathematics 106/107 (1992) 157-161. 
We propose a simple and flexible authentication scheme applicable for use with both binary 
and nonbinary messages and we show that, among the set of all possible messages of assigned 
length, all possible signatures occur with equal probability: that is, equally often. Additionally, 
our scheme allows calculation of the digits of the signature to be carried out in parallel. 
1. The scheme outlined 
The scheme proposed here may be used for both binary and nonbinary 
messages but, for the purposes of exposition, it is simplest to consider the 
nonbinary case first. 
Let ala2 +- . a,, be a message over a q-ary alphabet Q which is required to be 
authenticated by means of a signature of s additional q-ary digits bI, bz, , . . , b,. 
Let n = SC. We separate the message into s mutually disjoint subsets Si, 
i=l,2,..., s, of c not-necessarily-consecutive digits each. Each of these s 
subsets of message digits is used to calculate one of the digits bi. For the 
calculation, we make use of a latin square of order q. 
By a Latin square of order q is meant a matrix of size q x q whose entries are 
selected from a set of q different symbols (in this case, those of the message 
Correspondence to: Dr. J. D&es, Csaba utca. 10, Budapest 1122, Hungary. 
*This work was supported by SERC under grant GRD 79029. 
0012-365X/92/$05.00 @ 1992 - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved 
158 J. D&es, A.D. Keedwell 
alphabet Q) in such a way that each different symbol occurs exactly once in each 
row and exactly once in each column of the matrix. When a latin square is 
bordered above and on the left by the symbols of the alphabet Q in some order, 
an algebraic structure called a quasigroup (Q, *) is formed. Here, (*) is a binary 
operation on the set Q defined by saying that, for each pair of elements a, b of Q, 
the element a *b is the entry in the latin square whose row label is a and whose 
column label is b. (See Example 1 below for illustration.) Such a quasigroup is 
easily stored in a computer in the form of a look-up table or in specially designed 
hardware containing a ROM. It has the properties that the equations a *X = c and 
y * b = c are uniquely soluble in Q for x and y respectively. (We make use of this 
unique solubility of equations later in this paper). However, in general, the 
operation (ye) is neither a commutative nor an associative operation. 
We return to the calculation of the digits bi of the message signature. If the ith 
subset of message digits is Si = {ail, ui2, . . . , U,} and (Q, *) is a quasigroup 
defined by means of a latin square L of order q whose symbols are those of the 
message alphabet, then 
bi = [({(ail * Uiz)* Ui3} Q Ui4)'. . .I* U,. 
It will be clear to the reader that the calculation of the various bi can be carried 
out in parallel if desired. Provided that the recipient of the message holds a copy 
of the bordered latin square L (in the form of a look-up table, or otherwise) and 
also knows the means by which the subsets Si were constructed, the message is 
easily authenticated. In Example 1, we propose a relatively sophisticated way of 
constructing the subsets Si which again makes use of a quasigroup. In Example 2, 
we use a straightforward construction. 
For a binary message, the above scheme may easily be modified as follows. 
Suppose that a quasigroup (Q, *) of order q = 2” is to be used to compute the 
signature. We separate the message into subsets Si of trn binary digits each. Each 
of these sets of tm binary digits is used to calculate m binary digits of the 
signature. For this purpose, we interpret each subset of m binary digits of Si as a 
q-ary number (so as to represent Sj as a set of t q-ary numbers) and hence 
compute a single q-ary number bi corresponding to the subset Si as before. We 
then write bi as a binary number and append it to the message as part of the 
signature. Example 2 below illustrates the process. 
We emphasize that the two examples which follow are purely illustrative and so 
the messages are short and q is small. 
Example 1. The message to be authenticated is 1032/2031/0123/1003 and the 
subsets Si are to comprise sets of four digits selected by means of a key defined by 
the latin square L given below. Subset S, is to comprise the lst, 7th, 12th and 14th 
digits of the message as given by the positions of the zeros in the latin square L 
relative to the square N. Subset S, is to comprise the 4th, 6th, 9th and 15th digits 
of the message as given by the positions of the ones in the latin square L, and so 
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on. The signature digits are to be calculated using a quasigroup (Q, *) also based 
on L whose multiplication table is as shown. 
N= 
We find that 
S, = (1, 3, 3,O) b1=[(l*3)*3]*0=[3*3]*0=2*0=1, 
S, = (2, 0, 0, 01 bz=[(2*0)*0]*O=[1*0]*O=2*O=1, 
S, = {O, 2, 2, 3) b3=[(0*2)*2]*3=[3*2]*3=1*3=3, 
s4 = (3, 1, 1, 11 bq=[(3*1)*1]*1=[0*1]*1=2*1=3. 
We therefore transmit the message 10322031012310031133. 
Example 2. The binary message to be authenticated is 
001110101111/010000011110/010100000010. 
We decide that the subsets Si shall each consist of twelve consecutive symbols 
of the message and that we will choose m = 3. The quasigroup used to calculate 
the signature must consequently be of order 8(=23). We use the one whose 
multiplication is shown below. We split each set Si into (four) triples of binary 
digits and then we interpret each of these triples as the binary representation of 
an 8-ary integer. We find that 
S, = (1, 6,5,7) b,=[(l*6)*5]*7=[6*5]*7=2*5=4, 
S, = (2, 0, 3, 6) b,=[(2*0)*3]*6=[7*3]*6=2*6=2, 
S, = (2, 4, 0, 2) b3=[(2*4)*O]*2=[1*O]*2=O*2=4. 
The values of bl, b2, b3 when written as binary numbers are 100,010,100 so we 
transmit the message 
00111010111101OOOOO11110010100oooo101ooo10100. 
(In the case of a computer application, the authenticated message can be made up 
to form three complete words of length 16 by the adjunction of three dummy 
digits.) 










2. The signatures are equi-probable 
A desirable property of such an authentication scheme is that, among the 
signatures of the set of all possible messages (of assigned length), each q-ary digit 
should occur as often as any other in each assigned position so that each digit has 
equal probability of occurring in that position. This requires that the set of all 
possible products of t (not-necessarily-distinct) q-ary digits should contain each of 
the q digits equally often. We shall show that this property always holds for the 
scheme which we have proposed. 
Our proof consists in showing that, for a quasigroup (Q, *) of q elements, each 
element occurs exactly q times among the products of two elements of (2, q2 
times among the products of three elements of Q and, generally q’-’ times among 
the products of t elements of Q. (Since there are qf possible ordered products of t 
elements of Q, this shows that each element occurs equally often among these q’ 
products). 
We first observe that each element occurs exactly q times among the q2 
products of pairs of elements of Q. For, let Q = {aI, a2, . . . , aq} . Then the 
equation ai *x = b has exactly one solution for x in Q. Consequently, as ui varies 
through the q elements of Q, we find just q pairs of elements of Q whose product 
is the element b. Next, let us take as induction hypothesis that our result has 
already been proved for products of t - 1 elements of Q. Let Pj denote one of 
these products of t - 1 elements of Q . Since the equation ai *x = b has a unique 
solution for x in Q (say x = Ci) and since exactly q’-’ products 4 take the value ai, 
it follows that, corresponding to each of the qte2 products 4 which take the value 
ai, there is a product Pj * ci of t elements of Q which is equal to b. Thus, as i 
varies from 1 to q, we get q’-’ products of t elements of Q which are each equal 
to b. The result now follows by induction on the integer t. 
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3. Additional remarks 
It is obvious that, in the above scheme, the longer the signature (that is, the 
smaller the value of t), the more certain is the authentication. So, by balancing 
the size of r against the cost of longer messages, we may choose a best value for 
any given set of circumstances. 
If the message length n is not an exact multiple of t so that n = (s - 1)t + r, 
where O<r < t, we may modify the scheme slightly by allowing the last of the 
subsets Si to contain r q-ary digits instead of c such digits. 
Finally, we remark that, if so desired, the signature alphabet can be chosen to 
be larger than the message alphabet in order to improve the authentication 
scheme even in the case of nonbinary messages. The authors hope to develop this 
idea further in a subsequent paper. 
